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SOME COMMENTS ON NORTH DAKOTA OIL AND
GAS LAW - THREE CASES FROM THE EIGHTIES
RICHARD C. MAXWELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most land related legal subjects tend to become very local in
the sources from which they draw their solutions to problems.
Courts dealing with oil and gas problems, however, are more likely
to resort to a national pool of case law and commentary for
solutions. The product of the judicial process in North Dakota
thirty years after the Amerada Petroleum Corporation found oil in
the Clarence Iverson Well Number One offers excellent examples
of this phenomenon in three recent opinions of the North Dakota
Supreme Court: Gilbertson v. Charlson, I Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser,2 and
Norman Jessen & Associates v. Amoco Production Co. 3 These cases have
particular interest to those who follow developments in what may
be called classic oil and gas law. They are the kind of cases that are
reprinted in the Oil and Gas Reporter4 and that are prominent in law
school courses on the subject.
*Professor Maxwell taught at the University of North Dakota from 1947 to 1949 and was
counsel to the Amerada Petroleum Corporation during 1952 to 1953. He is a former Dean of the
U.C.L.A. School of Law and is currently a Professor of Law at Duke University.
1. 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981).
2. 299 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1980).
3. 305 N.W.2d 648 (N.D, 1981).
4. See Gilbertson v. Charlson, 69 OIL & GAS REP. (MB) 73 (N.D. 1981); Texaro Oil Co. v.
Mosser, 69 OIL & GAS REP. (MB) 81 (N.D. 1980). The Oil and Gas Reporter is edited by the
Southwestern Legal Foundation. It reprints and offers commentary on cases arising out of the
business of producing oil and gas.
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II. CONVEYANCES OF FRACTIONAL MINERAL
INTERESTS
In Gilbertson v. Charlson5 title to land and minerals passed to
three persons as co-owners subject to a five percent mineral
reservation in the state. 6 Two of the three co-owners conveyed
"all" of the property to the third by a warranty deed "[r]eserving
and excepting. . . to the Grantors fifty (50%) Per Centum of all oil,
natural gas and minerals . . . found on or underlying said
lands .... "I In an action to quiet title to eighty-one and two-thirds
percent of the minerals in claimants under the grantee, the trial
court gave summary judgment for the defendant grantors.
8
On appeal the plaintiffs argued that this grant "warranted a
conveyance of 50 percent of the mineral rights. "9 At the time of the
conveyance, the grantee owned a "31 3 interest ('/ of 95%)."10
Therefore, if the deed effectively passed another fifty percent to the
grantee, her ownership would be eighty-one and two-thirds percent
of the minerals.II The plaintiffs also argued that the grantors
"should be estopped from asserting their title to that portion of the
reserved mineral interest which is necessary to give the grantees
81 3A percent.'"1
2
This latter argument invoked the precedent of Kadrmas v.
Sauvageau. 13 In Kadrmas the grantor owned the surface and one-half
of the minerals. 14 He conveyed "the whole of the lands described,
excepting only a one-half mineral interest." 15 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the grantee received ownership of the
surface and one-half of the minerals.' 6 The Kadrmas case cited an
earlier North Dakota case 17 which provided that a "warranty ...
may operate as an estoppel."' 8 The Kadrmas opinion appears to be
based upon an analogy to the doctrine of estoppel by deed.' 9 That
doctrine operates to pass to the grantee in a warranty deed any
5. 301 N.W.2d 1744(N.D. 1981). For another analysis of this case, see Comment, 17 TULSA L.J.
117(1981).
6. Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144, 145 (N.D. 1981).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 145-46.




13. 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971).
14. Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753, 754 (N.D. 1971).
15. Id. at 755.
16. Id. at 754.
17. Aure v. Mackoff, 93 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1958).
18. 188 N.W.2d at 755-56 (quoting Aure v. Mackoff, 93 N.W.2d at 811).
19. See 188 N.W.2d at 756.
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interests later acquired by the grantor which were within the scope
of the granting instrument.
20
The Kadrmas situation, however, is not within the direct ambit
of the doctrine of estoppel by deed since it does not involve an after
acquired interest. Rather, it is concerned with the impact of a
conveyance on an interest which already is owned by the grantor at
the time the conveyance takes effect. 21 Therefore, Kadrmas is not a
case in which the doctrine of estoppel by deed operates to carry to
the grantee an interest which is acquired after the conveyance, but
which is within the scope of the conveyancing language. Instead,
the Kadrmas reasoning works by analogy to estoppel by deed,
fulfilling the scope of the conveyance by transferring to the grantee
an interest which was specifically reserved to the grantor.
22
This analogy is the basis of the decision in the leading case of
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 23 which is cited in the Kadrmas
opinion. 24 Duhig justifies its uses of the spirit, if not the letter, of
estoppel by deed in the following terms: "If such enforcement of
the warranty is a fair and effectual remedy in case of after-acquired
title, it is, we believe, equally fair and effectual and also appropriate
here." ' 25 The "here" in this statement from Duhig means a fact
situation which, in terms of the fractions and interests involved, is
substantially identical to Kadrmas. The author of the Duhig opinion,
Commissioner Smedley, did not find it necessary to base the
decision on an estoppel theory. In his view the deed in Duhig
purported to convey all interests in the land except for one-half of
the minerals. 26 That deed, like the instrument in Kadrmas,
27
contained a specific reservation to the grantor of "an undivided
one-half interest in and to all. . . minerals ... in the land." 28
One portion of the opinion in Kadrmas seems identical to
Commissioner Smedley's straight forward approach. The Kadrmas
opinion expresses the idea in the following language: "[T]he
Sauvageaus conveyed to the Kadrmases the whole of the lands
described, excepting only a one-half mineral interest.'"9 If this is a
proper interpretation of the language involved, there is no need to
make reference to estoppel by deed or to draw any analogy to that
20. See 6A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 927 (J. Rohan rev. ed. 1981).
21. See 188 N.W.2d at 754.
22. See id. at 756.
23. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878(1940).
24. 188 N.W.2d at 756. (citing Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W 2d
878 (1940)).
25. 135 Tex. 503, 508, 144 S.W.2d 878, 880.
26. Id. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
27. 188 N.W.2d at 754.
28. 135 Tex. at 506, 144 S.W.2d at 879.
29. 188 N.W.2d at 755.
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doctrine. The deed purports to convey all and reserves half; thus, it
conveys half.
The majority of the court in Duhig, as noted above, adopts a
more complex basis for its decision. The court first found an intent
to leave the grantor with one-half of the minerals. 30 Since "the deed
warrants the title to the surface estate and also to an undivided one-
half interest in the minerals," '31 a retention of one-half by the
grantor leaves the warranty unfulfilled. Thus, the warranty in the
deed is breached when the conveyance is made. 32 Although the
Duhig opinion states its recognition of "the rule that the covenant of
general warranty does not enlarge the title conveyed," ' 33 it is hard
to escape the conclusion that the decision ultimately rests on the
finding of an intent in the instrument as a whole to convey-the
surface and one-half of the minerals in the described land.
34
A problem with the analysis in Duhig is the court's finding that
the grantor intended to "retain" one-half of the minerals. 35 This
finding led the majority of the court in Duhig to what was for them
the logical necessity of saying that the one-half of the minerals
owned is retained by the grantor, but that the grantor is then
estopped "to set up such title against the grantee." ' 36 Thus, the
one-half owned by the grantor is not conveyed, but it is forever lost
to the grantor by estoppel. The very statement of this theory
arouses sympathy for the argument that the proper remedy for the
grantee is to sue on the warranty, leaving the grantor with his
retained one-half interest. 37 The plaint of the dissenting judge in
Salmen Brick &Lumber Co. v. Williams 38 seems appropriate:
I am unable to find support in a theory by which a court
seeks gratuitously to save a grantor against an anticipated
suit for breach of warranty. A warranty does not effect the
conveyance. Title is acquired by the conveyance and
guaranteed by the warranty. Nor is a deed void which
subjects the grantor to a possible suit to enforce the
warranty or for damages. 39
30. 135 Tex. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 879-80.
31. Id. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 508, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
34. See id. at 506-07, 144 S.W.2d at 879-80.
35. Id. at 507-08, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
36. Id. at 508, 144 S.W.2d at 881.
37. See id. at 508, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
38. 210 Miss. 560, 50 So. 2d 130(1951).
39. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 210 Miss. 560, 576, 50 So. 2d 130, 136-37 (1951)
(Alexander, J., dissenting).
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Although, as noted above, Kadrmas seemed to track Commissioner
Smedley's reasoning at an important point in its opinion, the
Kadrmas deed expressly reserves one-half of the minerals "unto the
grantors'4 0 as do the instruments in Gilbertson4 1 and Duhig.42 The
Kadrmas opinion, like Duhig,4" bases its final result on an estoppel
growing out of the warranty: "We conclude that the Sauvageaus
[grantors] could not convey and warrant, and reserve and retain,
the same thing at the same time, but the warranty obligation is
superior to the Sauvageaus' reservation rights."44
The estoppel in Kadrmas is a technical estoppel. In substance it
means little more than when the minerals withheld are subtracted
from the minerals conveyed, the remainder is the fraction
conveyed. The result is disturbing only when this technical estoppel
is seen as depriving the grantor of the right to assert ownership of
the minerals he expressly reserved. The estoppel idea is the likely
source of the "undercurrent of disfavor" with the Duhig rule noted
by Professors Williams and Meyers45 and reiterated by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota in Gilbertson v. Charlson.4 6 This
"disfavor" was certainly a factor in the Supreme Court of Texas's
refusal to extend the Duhig doctrine to oil and gas leases in McMahon
v. Christmann,4 7 a decision given a prominent place in the Gilbertson
opinion.
8
If the oil and gas leasing transaction is compared with the kind
of transaction which is at issue in cases like Gilbertson and Duhig, it
becomes apparent that the Duhig rule is simply not applicable to
leases. In Duhig situations land is conveyed with a percentage of the
minerals reserved to the grantor. The ultimate question is the
determination of the percentage of the mineral interest which has
passed under the language of the deed. After the effective date of
the conveyance the parties will be simply grantor and grantee or, at
most, co-owners. The nature of a lease is different. After a leasing
transaction, the lessee will own for a term all or a part of the right to
explore for and produce the minerals, subject to an obligation to
pay for or deliver a portion of the produced minerals to the lessor
free of the cost of production. The quality of the lessee's working
interest and the lessor's royalty interest is quite different.
40. 188 N.W.2d at 754.
41. 301 N.W.2d at 145.
42. 135 Tex. at 506, 144 S.W.2d at 879.
43. Id. at 508, 144 S.W.2d at 880-81.
44. 188 N.W.2d at 756.
45. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 311, at 578.33 (1981) [hereinafter WILLIAMS
& MEYVERSI.
46. 301 N.W.2d at 146 n.2.
47. 157 Tex. 403,411,303 S.W.2d 341,346 (1957).
48. 301 N.W.2d at 146 n.2.
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If the typical one-eighth royalty is reserved and the lease
carries the full right to explore and produce to the lessee, in effect,
the bargain is that the lessee has agreed to pay in kind or in value
one-eighth of the total gross production from the land. In McMahon
the owner of a one-sixth undivided interest executed a lease
covering the entire mineral interest in the land using a printed form
which included a general warranty clause and a proportionate
reduction clause.4 9 In addition to the printed reservation of a one-
eighth royalty there was inserted in the lease a typewritten clause
reserving "without reduction, as an overriding royalty, a 1/32nd of
8/8ths of all oil or gas produced and saved from the above described
premises." ' 50 In spite of the words "without reduction" the lower
court reduced the additional royalty by applying the fraction one-
sixth, the mineral interest actually conveyed. 51 The Supreme Court
of Texas reversed, but remanded the case for trial on the issue of
the reformation of the lease words "without reduction. "52
Putting aside the question whether the warranty extends
beyond the interest for which the bonus was actually paid, the
normal lease bargain is that the lessee will pay one-eighth of gross
production in return for a lease of the full rights to the minerals in
the land. If the grantor has only a one-sixth interest in the minerals,
but he has purported to convey all, an application of Duhig would
cause any reserved royalty to be carried to the lessee or would estop
the lessor from claiming any royalty. Even without the specific
remedy for failure of the lessor's mineral title provided by the
proportionate reduction clause, the bargain would seem to be that
if the lessee had agreed to pay a one-eighth royalty for the total
mineral rights in the land, a lease carrying a one-sixth interest, if
accepted, would call for the payment of a one-sixth of one-eighth
royalty.53
In this situation there is no rational analogy to the Duhig
precedent. The lessor's royalty interest is created as payment for
the working interest conveyed to the lessee. It amounts to a charge
on that interest and is a property right with entirely different
characteristics from those involved in Duhig. It is an interest created
by the lease transaction, not, as in Duhig, an interest in the grantor
available to allow the grantee to realize the scope of the conveyance
49. McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 405-06, 303 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1957).
A proportionate reduction clause provides that when the lessor owns less than the entire fee
simple estate in the leased land, then royalties and delay rental will be proportionately reduced. See
4 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 46.6(h), at 65 (1972).
50. 157 Tex. at 405-06, 303 S.W.2d at 343.
51. Id. at 406, 303 S.W.2d at 343.
52. Id. at 413, 303 S.W.2d at 348.
53. See generally I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, § 316.4,
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as it is written. If, in a leasing transaction, there is an effective
warranty broader than the mineral interest which the lessor has
leased, the proper remedy would seem to be an action on the
warranty to recover the excess bonus paid.
In the McMahon case the "overriding royalty" specified to be
"without reduction" was nothing more than an increase in a
royalty in payment for the mineral interest that was available for
leasing. The parties were aware that they were not dealing with a
full interest in the land. 54 The court stated that although "a lessee
knows a lessor owns less than the full fee title to the premises -. . he
often . . . prepares and insists upon a lease which purports to
convey the entire fee in order to make certain that no fractional
interest is left outstanding in the lessor. ''5 Knowledge on the part
of the lessee that less than a full interest in the minerals is being
leased may be important to the question of whether the additional
royalty was really to be "without reduction." It also may, as a
practical matter, affect the amount of bonus actually paid and thus
render a more extensive warranty ineffectual. 56 Such knowledge,
however, should have no impact on the quantum of the interest
leased and the royalty effectively reserved. The reservation of a
royalty is a charge on the minerals leased, not a diminution in their
quantity.
Knowledge by the grantee of the actual state of the title may,
however, have an impact on the application of the Duhig rule, such
-as in that leading case itself and in the Kadrmas case. In such
situations, unlike McMahon, the reservation to the grantor is an
interest with the same qualities as the subject of the purported
grant. Although the mineral reservations in Duhig and Kadrmas
were in the chain of title of the grantee who was, at least, subject to
constructive notice of their existence, no point is made of a notice
factor in either decision. The court in Gilbertson makes reference to
Kadrmas's lack of any claim based on notice. 57 The court also notes
that in Gilbertson the grantee "Pauline Gilbertson had actual notice
of the outstanding 31 2/3 percent interest as she was the owner of
that interest" and that she had at least constructive notice of the
state's five percent mineral reservation. 5
8
54. 157 Tex. at 412, 303 S.W.2d at 347.
55. Id. at 410, 303 S.W.2d at 346. See generally 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, 5 505.
56. The practice of drafting leases to be executed by the owner of an undivided interest that
purport to cover all of the minerals in a described tract should be considered in light of Texaco, Inc.
v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 533 P.2d 647 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). That case held the doctrine of
estoppel by deed inapplicable where the lessee's proof showed a bonus check which specified that it
was only payment for an undivided one-fourth interest in the described tract, the interest actually
owned by the lessorat the time of the lease. Id. at 649.
57. 301 N.W.2d at 147.
58. Id. at 148 (footnote omitted).
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Body v. McDonald,59 cited by the Gilbertson court as being
suggestive of a position contrary to its own, 60 involved a
conveyance which described all of a tract when there was a one-
fourth mineral interest outstanding in a third person. 6' The deed
reserved to the grantors "an undivided one-fourth (V4) interest" in
the minerals. 62 The evidence showed that the grantee knew of the
outstanding one-fourth interest at the time of the conveyance. 63 On
the basis of this knowledge the grantor contended "that the
doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied ... because it is inapplicable
when the parties had full knowledge of the facts." ' 64 The court
considered this argument and stated: "Learned counsel have failed
to distinguish between an estoppel in pais and an estoppel by
deed.' '65
The Gilbertson court, on the other hand, did look to the
elements of estoppel in pais as a basis for its decision. 66 From the
opinion, one must conclude that the court would find the elements
of detrimental reliance in a fraudulent statement of title made to a
person who lacked "actual knowledge regarding the true state of
title" and was "destitute of . . . means of acquiring such
knowledge. "67 As noted above, the court specifies that the Gilbertson
grantee owned "the outstanding 31 2/3 percent interest" and that
she "had at least constructive notice of the state's reservation of five
percent of the mineral interest as that reservation was of record."
68
In Gilbertson the only representation is found in the conveyance
which purports to convey "all," reserving to the grantors fifty
percent of the minerals. 69 Together the grantors actually owned
sixty-three and one-third percent of the minerals.7 0 The arithmetic
of the situation is that they purported to convey one hundred
percent of the minerals minus fifty percent of the minerals,
resulting in a purported conveyance of fifty percent of the minerals.
The grantee knew that the grantors owned enough of the minerals
to accomplish this. She also knew, actually or constructively, that
they did not own enough of the minerals to be left with fifty
percent. 7 If the elements of estoppel in pais must be found for the
59.79 Wyo. 371,334 P.2d 513 (1959).
60. 301 N.W.2d at 148.
61. Body v. McDonald, 79 Wyo. 371, ,334P.2d513,514(1959).
62. Id. at . . .. 334 P.2d at 514.
63. Id.
64. Id. at-__ , 334 P.2d at 517.
65. Id.
66. 301 N.W.2d at 147.
67. Id. (citing Gjerstadengen v. Hartzell, 9 N.D. 268, 276, 83 N.W. 230 232 (1900)).
68. 301 N.W.2d at 148.
69. Id. at 145.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 148.
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grantee to successfully claim that fifty percent of the minerals have
been conveyed, there is no basis for her case. The idea of applying
estoppel in pais departs materially from the basis on which Duhig
and Kadrmas were decided.72
Duhig, Body, and Kadrmas differ from Gilbertson on another
matter also. In each of these three cases the fraction reserved was
identical in amount to the fractional interest of outstanding
minerals. For example, in Duhig the interest outstanding was fifty
percent of the minerals, and the interest reserved was fifty percent
of the minerals. Perhaps it is easier in such a situation to find an
intent merely to cover the outstanding fraction of minerals rather
than to reserve such fraction for the beneficial use of the grantor.
Nevertheless, the cases beginning with Duhig have found an intent
to beneficially reserve to the grantor only to bury such intent in the
arithmetic of the conveyance, justifying the interment with a
technical estoppel.
The arithmetic is still there in Gilbertson but it is not as neat.
One hundred percent is conveyed, fifty percent is reserved, and
thirty-six and two-thirds percent is outstanding. In its summation
the case seems to be saying that the intent to reserve fifty percent of
the minerals to the grantors is so clear in these circumstances that
the arithmetic is irrelevant and no warranty is breached.7 3 With
this thesis the court's discourse on estoppel in pais seems an
unnecessary appendage. The court may be right as to the intent of
the parties in Gilbertson, but there is room for a purist to complain
that the deed has been reformed under the guise of interpreting it.
The problems presented by the conveyances dealt with here
can be avoided at the source by careful drafting of the granting
clause to cover only the interest intended to be conveyed, but North
Dakota conveyances in the pattern of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber
Company74 have a different meaning after Gilbertson than they had
before.
III. THE MINERAL-ROYALTY DISTINCTION
In Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser75 the claims to portions of an
undivided one-half interest in certain land exceeded the one-half
72. In Duhig the outstanding interest was in the chain of title of the grantee and the grantee was
on constructive notice of the interest. See 135 Tex. at 505, 144 S.W.2d at 879. The issue, however,
was not raised.
73. 301 N.W.2d at 148.
74. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
75. 299 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1980).
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interest available to satisfy them. 76 In the litigation to determine the
priorities of these claims it appeared that the first interest recorded
relevant to the question of priorities was an option "to purchase a
1/8 of 1/8 royalty" in the land.77 The parties to the option were, at
a later time, parties to a conveyance of "an undivided 200/1597.20
mineral acre interest in and to all of the oil, gas . . . and other
minerals in and under and that may be produced" from the land at
issue. 78 This deed was recorded, but its date of recording caused it
to be subordinate to other claims unless it could be tied to the
option to create an identity of interest and take priority from the
option's recordation.79
There can be no quarrel with the court's action in affirming
the judgment denying any connection between the option and the
deed sufficient to clothe the deed with the recording priority
attained by the option. 80 Among the differences noted by the court
was the fact that the "interest described in the option is a one-
eighth of one-eighth royalty, and the interest described in the
mineral deed is a 200/1597.20 mineral interest." 8 The conclusion
"that the royalty option was not exercised by the mineral deed"
followed easily. 8
2
The questions which Mosser raises for this commentator relate
to statements in the opinion quite unnecessary to the result reached
in the case, but which could return to plague the court. After
pointing out that the terms "mineral" and "royalty" describe
different interests which have quite different characteristics, the
court addressed itself to a Kansas case, Stratmann v. Stratmann, 83 and
adopted the idea that a "royalty interest is personal property and
refers to the owner's right to receive a certain part of the proceeds
from oil and gas, [sic] leases if and when there is production. "84
A somewhat plausible reason for classifying royalty interests as
personalty or realty might lie in the application of the land
recording system, but the recording status of the royalty option is
irrelevant given the court's finding that it has no relationship to the
mineral deed. In any event, a royalty interest, whatever its
classification, is probably within the ambit of the North Dakota
recording statutes since it is "an instrument affecting the title
76. Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser, 299 N.W.2d 191, 192 (ND. 1980).
77. Id. at 193.
78. Id. at 194.
79. Id. at 193.
80. Id. at 196.
81. Id. at 194.
82. Id.
83. 204 Kan. 658, 465 P.2d 938 (1970).
84. 299 N.W.2d at 194.
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to . real property." ,85
When the confusion engendered in Kansas by the idea of oil
and gas interests as personalty is considered, 86 North Dakota's
gratuitous embrace of the notion seems strange. Actually, the
Stratmann case, cited by Mosser for the proposition that royalty
interests are personalty, does not base its decision on this idea at all.
The question before the Kansas court was whether a partition
decree "made subject to the mineral rights of the several part
owners"8 7 was intended to continue co-ownership of the minerals
so long as production continued from the entire tract or whether co-
ownership was "dependent upon continued production from
specific leases" of portions of the tract. 88 The court decided that the
language of the partition decree meant that co-ownership of the
minerals would last as long as there was production from any part
of the tract.8 9 The classification of royalties as realty or personalty
was not involved in this conclusion. Whether the partition decree
intended the interest held in common to continue so long as there
was production from any part of the tract turned on a distinction
between minerals and royalties only to the extent of determining
whether "the interest reserved was . . . a royalty interest under a
lease." 90 Such an interest, being dependent on a lease, would end
with the lease. 9 1 The distinction between a mineral interest in the
entire tract subject to the partition decree and a royalty reserved in
a lease covering only a part of the tract has nothing to do with the
royalty interest being personalty and the mineral interest being
realty. The realty-personalty distinction thus has no more to do
with the Kansas decision than it does with the North Dakota court's
decision in Mosser into which it is injected.
The realty-personalty distinction can, however, have a real
impact in some situations. The difficulty stems from the fact that
the classification of royalties as personalty misconceives the nature
of a royalty interest. The Mosser case states that a "royalty interest
85. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-19-01 (1978).
86. In the old case of Phillips v. Springfield Crude Oil Co., 76 Kan. 783, 92 P. 1119 (1907), an
oil and gas lease was found sufficiently lacking in the attributes of real property needed to support a
mechanic's lien under the Kansas statute. Id. at 784, 92 P. at 1119. The Kansas legislature
responded with a statute establishing a species of mechanic's lien for oil and gas leases which was to
be enforced in the same fashion as mechanic's liens against real estate. See KAN. STAT. ANN. S 55-207
(1976). After reviewing the state of Kansas law the Kansas Supreme Court determined in a more
recent case that oil and gas leases are personal property in some contexts and real property in others,
but for purposes of the real property recording act they are to be treated as real property. Ingram v.
Ingram, 214 Kan. 415, 419-21, 521 P.2d 254, 257-59 (1974).
87. Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658, 659, 465 P.2d 938, 941 (1970).
88. Id. at 664, 465 P.2d at 944.
89. Id. at 665, 465 P.2d at 944.
90. Id. at 664, 465 P.2d at 944.
91. Id.
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is personal property' '92 and that the interest "refers to the owner's
right to receive a certain part of the proceeds from oil and gas, [sic]
leases if and when there is production. "91 Apart from the
characterization of a royalty as personalty, this definition is not
accurately descriptive of the kind of interest created by the
language of the option in Mosser. In Mosser no reference is made to
the proceeds of any particular lease. In spite of the use of the
common lease royalty fraction of one-eighth, the one-eighth of one-
eighth royalty in the option agreement is established to last in
perpetuity and will be a charge on the land whether the land is
leased or unleased, producing or nonproducing. 94 Such an interest
is frequently called a perpetual nonparticipating royalty. 95 It need
not be created with reference to an oil and gas lease on the land
involved. If there is a lease on the land at the time the lessor-
landowner creates a perpetual royalty, the landowner's right to his
royalty share of the production from the land will go to the grantee
of the perpetual royalty interest, to the extent necessary to satisfy it.
Thus, using the figures from the Mosser option, the one-eighth
of one-eighth royalty would entitle its grantee to one sixty-fourth of
the gross production from the land if there were production. If this
portion of oil were run into the grantee's measuring tanks; then it
would indeed be personal property. But, the perpetual royalty
interest which is the basis for its owner's entitlement to the oil is an
interest in land and continues to be an interest in land after the
lease under which the production occurred expires. To say that the
royalty interest is personalty because its owner is entitled to a
portion of the oil produced is to confuse the product of a real
property interest with the interest itself.
As far as the realty-personalty distinction is concerned, much
of the above comment is applicable to the Kansas rooted Mosser
definition of a royalty as "a certain part of the proceeds from oil
and gas, [sic] leases if and when there is production. "96 The
interest described in Mosser, sometimes called a landowner or
lessor's royalty, 97 is created by transferring the development rights
to the lessee. If the landowner's royalty is one-eighth, the lessee has
seven-eighths of the minerals from which to meet his development
expenses and to make his profit. The royalty is expense free, but
the landowner has, in effect, paid his share of development costs by
92. Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser, 299 N.W.2d at 194.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 193-94.
95. See8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, at 473, 539.
96. 299 N.W.2d at 194.
97. See 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, at 387.
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his conveyance of seven-eighths of the oil to the lessee. The
landowner has, of course, divested himself of all of the operating
rights for the duration of the lease. When the lease is terminated the
former lessor will again be fully in control of all operating and
development rights unless mineral interests have been conveyed to
other persons.
Mosser also characterizes a "mineral interest" as "a real
property interest created in oil and gas in place. ''98 Further, it
states that the "prime characteristic of a mineral interest is the right
to enter the land to explore, drill, produce and otherwise carry on
mining activities." 99 Stratmann is cited again for these propositions
and for the conclusion that it "is this attribute of operating rights
that distinguishes a mineral interest from a royalty interest.'' 100
This statement is certainly accurate as far as it goes, and it
somewhat softens the court's earlier assertion that royalty interests
are personalty. There is, however, another aspect of mineral-
royalty transactions to which the statement could be misleading.
Suppose that the interest under consideration is created with
words that are effective to create a mineral interest, but that the
right to lease is specifically separated from the granted interest by
further language and thus retained by the grantor. Such a
transaction has a practical purpose in avoiding the necessity of
joining the grantee in any future lease, since it leaves all leasing
power in the grantor. This transaction creates a valid interest often
referred to as a nonexecutive mineral interest. 101 A further step
could be taken by a transaction which divests from a granted
mineral interest the right to explore, the right to lease, and the right
to receive bonus and rentals from any future leasing transaction.
The resulting interest has been called a "non-participating"
mineral interest. 10 2 An example using the Mosser fractions would
be: 0 to A and his heirs one sixty-fourth of the oil and gas in and
under Blackacre, but it is expressly understood that grantee is to
have no power to develop or to lease for oil and gas development as
these rights shall be exclusively retained by grantor, his heirs and
transferees; further, the grantee shall not participate in the benefits
of any bonus or rental payments which may be obtained in any oil
and gas lease entered into by grantor, his heirs and transferees.
Is an interest with the above characteristics, a non-
participating mineral interest, in effect only a royalty interest? Such
98. 299 N.W.2d at 194.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, at 469-70.
102. See8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, at 469, 473.
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an interest lacks the attribute of operating rights that the Mosser
opinion says "distinguishes a mineral interest from a royalty
interest.'' 103 Yet, if the interest is royalty and the usual share of
production attributed to royalty is allocated to its owner, the
entitlement will be one sixty-fourth of gross production rather than
one sixty-fourth of any royalty reserved in a lease. The latter is the
usual share going to the owner of a one sixty-fourth mineral
interest. A transaction which simply creates a "one sixty-fourth
royalty" interest would result in a share of one sixty-fourth of gross
production and the owner would take no part of the bonus or rental
payment under any lease. The interest created by the conveyance
set out above first created a mineral interest which, without more,
would include the power to lease or develop Blackacre. Then the
language proceeded to remove the leasing and development rights
and the concomitant benefits of bonus and rentals. The transaction
does not seem to be one in which there exists an intention to give
the grantee the stated fraction of the gross production. Rather, it
seems that the intention is that the grantee of such an interest is to
have the usual share of a one sixty-fourth mineral owner in the
royalty proceeds of a lease, one sixty-fourth of any royalty reserved.
Thus, with a lease reserving the usual one-eighth royalty a
grantee would get one sixty-fourth of one-eighth or one five-
hundred-twelfth of production. This result takes account of an
attribute of mineral interests that is not mentioned by the opinions
in either the Mosser or the Stratmann case - a mineral interest bears
the expense of production. 0 4 If the owner of the minerals develops
them himself, it is obvious that he bears the expense of drilling and
production before he can receive any net benefits from his
ownership. If a mineral owner leases, he bears the expense, as
mentioned earlier, when he makes the lease and gives the lessee
seven-eighths of the minerals from which to pay the expenses and
reap any profits from the operation.
The owner of a nonexecutive or nonparticipating mineral
interest has agreed that the power to lease will be in another. When
the holder of that power exercises it, the inactive mineral owner is
subject to the bargaining results that the holder of the power
obtains in the leasing transaction. In the example given above, the
one sixty-fourth mineral interest becomes, for purposes of sharing
the benefits of production, one sixty-fourth of whatever royalty
share is reserved. Mineral interests and royalty interests are
103. 299 N.W.2d at 194.
104. See Maxwell, The Mineral-Royalty Distinction and the Expense ofProduction, 33 TEx. L. REv. 463
(1955).
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obviously quite different, but that difference is not fully expressed
by saying that they differ in the "attribute of operating rights. o105
To further say that the two types of interests differ in that a
"royalty interest is personal property" and a "mineral interest
is . . . real property" is to add a distinction that neither withstands
analysis nor aids in achieving rational and functional results in
dealing with oil and gas conveyancing problems. 10 6 One result of
such thinking is to conclude that a royalty interest is of lesser worth
than a mineral interest. As has been illustrated, in terms of the
share of production appropriately allocated to it, a royalty interest
will far outstrip in value a numerically similar mineral interest. 107
The royalty interest is efficient in that it automatically leaves
the leasing power in the grantor, simplifying the process of bringing
the land to development. No reason is apparent why royalty
interests should be subjected to conceptual prejudice that impedes
their functional importance. Yet, the failure in Kansas, and
perhaps in North Dakota, to recognize that a royalty interest is an
existing interest in realty, not dependent for any aspect of its legal
existence on production from the land to which it relates, may
result in the invalidity of such an interest. For example, the Kansas
court in Lathrop v. Eyestone 0 8 held that a royalty interest violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities, apparently on the theory that any
interest created was contingent until production was obtained from
the land described.109  "It is," the court stated, "wholly
105. 299 N.W.2d at 194.
106. In a later action involving the interests dealt with in Stratmann, the question was posed
whether the receipt of royalties by one who was not their owner for the period of the adverse
possession statute of limitations could perfect ownership to the royalty interest, thereby entitling the
payee to continued receipt of the payments. Stratmann v. Stratmann, 6 Kan. App. 2d 403, -,
628 P.2d 1080, 1083, 1085 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Stratmann III. The Kansas court answered the
question by applying the personal property classification for royalty interests: "Adverse possession
applies only to real property. One cannot obtain a royalty interest by adverse possession." Id. at
- ,628 P.2d at 1085.
The result in Stratmann II may be correct, but the statement that royalty is personalty does not
seem to advance the analysis of the problem. An entitlement to royalty could be the result of either
the ownership of a mineral interest to which the royalty rights are appurtenant or, in most states, a
perpetual royalty created apart from a mineral interest. The Kansas court in Stratmann II analyzed
the situation in terms of a royalty related to mineral ownership and determined that the collection of
royalties does not "constitute adverse possession of the minerals in place. Such collection of royalty
payments is merely conversion of the oil and gas that has already been produced and does not affect
what remains in the ground." Id. at __, 628 P.2d at 1085 (citations omitted). Such an analysis
eschews any recognition of a royalty as an interest existing apart from a mineral interest, although in
the later Stratmann case all of the parties recognized that the minerals had been conveyed and that all
that was being claimed on the basis of adverse possession was a royalty. Stratmann II does hold for the
royalty claimant, but it does so on the basis of waiver, estoppel, and laches rather than on an
entitlement to royalty thesis. Id. at -, 628 P.2d at 1087. The impact of a receipt of excessive
royalties for the period of the statute of limitations on actions to recover the possession of land was
also considered in Warmack v. Henry H. Cross Co., and the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that
no title to royalty had accrued by adverse possession. 237 Ark. 869, -, 377 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1964).
107, See generaly Maxwell, The Mineral-Royalty Distinction - A Question of How Much, 10 GONz. L.
REV. 731 (1975).
108. 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136(1951).
109. Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 428, 227 P.2d 136, 144 (1951). Most authority does
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problematical when, if ever, such an interest under future leases
would vest." 11 It is true that the North Dakota court has stated
that "strictly speaking" the common law Rule Against Perpetuities
does not exist in North Dakota.11 Its operative sphere has been
occupied by a statute forbidding the suspension of the "absolute
power of alienation . . . for a longer period than during the
continuance of the lives of persons in being . . . and twenty-one
years. "I 2 Yet, there are indications that North Dakota will "find a
remoteness ingredient in its statutory rule" '113 which might be a
factor in a determination of the validity of royalty interests in North
Dakota.
IV. DELAY RENTALS
In Norman Jessen & Associates v. Amoco Production Co. 114 the
problem of the "unless" lease with its crisis oriented delay rental
clause is considered. 1 5 The leases before the court had multiple
lessors who were all paid a substantial bonus and who received
what were on the face of the documents appropriate rental
payments from 1973 through 1978.116 Amoco was the owner of the
leases throughout this period and had not drilled, but it had done
seismographic work on the leased land. 1 7 Prior to the execution of
the leases, however, some of the persons named as lessors conveyed
their mineral ownership to their co-owners by instruments which
were duly recorded. 118 In 1979 the grantee co-owners executed
"top leases" ' 19 to Norman Jessen, claiming that rental payments
under the Amoco leases had been deficient since the payments were
divided among all lessors named in the lease, including those who
had divested themselves of their mineral ownership in favor of their
co-owners. 120 Amoco increased its rental payments to each of these
not label a royalty interest as contingent until production is obtained. See I E. KUNTZ, supra note 49,
17.3 (1962 & Supp. 1981).
110. 170 Kan. at 419, 227 P.2d at 144.
111. See Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799, 807 (N.D. 1955).
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27 (1978).
113. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 20, 822[11, at 75-116.
114. 305 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1981).
115. NormanJessen & Assocs. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D. 1981).
If the failure to pay rentals is phrased in terms of a special limitation, then the usual result on the
occurrence of such an event is automatic termination without regard to equities. Thus, payment of
rentals is a "crisis" in the sense that there is no second chance. See Discussion Notes, 26 OIL & GAS
REP. (MB) 649-50 (Nov. 1967).
116. 305 N.W.2d at 649.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Thejessen opinion adopts the definition of "top lease" which appears in 8 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 45, at 777. Injessen the court stated that a "top lease" is "[a] lease granted by a
landowner during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to become effective if and when
the existing lease expires or is terminated." 305 N.W.2d at 649 n. 2.
120. 305 N.W.2d at 649.
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owner-lessors for the current year, but did not make any
adjustment for the claimed past deficiencies. 12' The owner-lessors
demanded release of the earlier leases, and countervailing affidavits
of validity were filed by Amoco. The lessee in the top leases,
Norman Jessen, commenced this action to quiet title to the oil and
gas leaseholds.12 Summary judgment was entered against Amoco.
On appeal the question before the court was whether the case was
appropriate for summary judgment. 
23
The court noted the classic "unless"-" or" dichotomy in the
structure of oil and gas leases. 124 It also stated the traditional view
of the inapplicability of equitable principles to ease the rigor of the
impact of the special limitation in the unless clause. 125 This opinion
did not reach out directly to case authority from other states as did
the previous decisions discussed in this comment, but looked
initially to two of the influential national secondary authorities on
oil and gas law, Summers126 and Williams.
127
A proper case for summary judgment is, according to the
opinion, one in which there is "no genuine issue as to any material
fact" including the absence of "reasonable differences of opin-
ion . . .as to the inferences to be drawn from the undisputed
facts.' ' 28 In support of the summary judgment in his favor top
lessee Norman Jessen relied on the absence of any dispute as to the
facts and urged that the operation of the determinable fee as
embodied in the unless clause concluded the matter. 29 Amoco
argued that the facts left open the possibility of showing that either
an estoppel against the owner-lessors or a mutual mistake pre-
cluded the application of the unless clause to terminate the leases. 30
The court found that Amoco was on constructive notice of the
deeds from one set of co-owners to their peers, but that such notice
did not preclude estoppel. 131 "rTlhe record owners [of the oil and




125. Id. at 651.
126. Id. (citing 2 & 3 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 5§ 334, 452 (1959 & Supp. 1981)).
See 2 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 334 (1959) for a discussion of the background of
the oil and gas industry leading to the development and adoption of the "unless" clause to provide
for automatic termination and the avoidance of an obligation to pay rentals when the lease is no
longer considered valuable to the lessee.
127. 305 N.W.2d at 651 (citing 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, § 606, 606.3, 607.8).
3 WILIiAMS & MEYERS, supra note 45, S 606.2 lists the many situations in which automatic
termination of a lease with an "unless" clause has been sustained. It notes that the lessee who
benefits from the feature of automatic termination "should have no standing to claim relief from the
automatic termination when he is responsible for a failure to make timely payment of rental." Id.
S606.2, at 159.
128. 305 N.W.2d at 650 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 651.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 652.
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gas interests] presented no objection to the amount of the bonus
payment or the delay rental payments until a second oil and gas
lease was executed. ' 13 2 Further, "Amoco . . . conducted an
expensive seismographical survey on the property.... 133
The possibility that the doctrine of "mutual mistake" might
be applicable to the facts was also accepted by the court as a basis
for overturning the summary judgment. 1 3 4 Apparently, application
of the doctrine would allow reformation of the lease so that only
those persons actually owning minerals after the prelease
conveyances would be shown as lessors. After reformation, the
rentals could presumably be paid under the protective cover of
equity to the proper persons in the proper amounts back to the
beginning of the leasing relationship.
The court noted that where a basis for equitable intervention can
be found, the operation of the "unless" clause may thwart justice
since the "economic waste caused by a result which, deprives the
lessee of the benefit of its operations cannot be seen as a benefit to
the lessors, who encourage development of oil and gas.' ' 35 Of
course, as the court points out, "the lessors [would] receive
substantial bonus payments and delay rental payments as a result
of the termination of the leases executed to Amoco."
3 6
The possibility of removing a lease from valuable mineral land
and leasing it again, perhaps in a better market, is the motive
behind the large amount of litigation that has occurred on the
subject of delay rentals. Why an industry so fully supplied with
legal advice allowed a provision so deleterious to its interests as the
unless rental clause to continue into the present era is difficult to
divine. 3 7 It is true, of course, that once a particular form of
document attains widespread use it acquires a momentum that is
hard to check. 1
38
The North Dakota court's willingness to use equitable
principles to block the termination of a lease for failure to properly
pay rentals under an "unless" clause has counterparts in other
132. Id
133. Id.
134. Id. at 653.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The loss that may be incurred if a lease ends as the result of an error in rental payments
would almost always outweigh the continuing liability for rentals under a lease that is no longer
wanted but that requires positive action on the part of the lessee for termination.
138. This tendency is exacerbated in the oil industry because the operator who develops the land
under a lease frequently does not control the original leasing transaction. The lease often is obtained
by assignment from a speculator to whom the terms of the document were not of principal
importance.
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jurisdictions. 13 9 There is also some foundation for the approach
taken in NormanJessen in other North Dakota cases.
Early in the legal history of oil and gas law in North Dakota,
the federal courts dealt with the problem of delay rentals in Hove v.
Atchison. 14 0 The lease in Hove purported to cover a full interest in the
land described, but rentals were paid on the assumption that a
statutory reservation of fifty percent of the minerals in the county
justified a reduction of the amount due under the lesser interest
clause.' 4 1 After the first rental payment was made the statute
providing for mineral reservations in the counties was invalidated
by the Supreme Court of North Dakota, 142 and the lessor's title to
the previously reserved minerals was quieted in an action to which
the lessee was not a party. 143 One month prior to the rental date the
second annual rental payment was deposited to the credit of the
lessor in the appropriate bank in the same amount as the first
payment. 144 The payment was returned to the lessee by cashier's
check six days after the rental date. With the check came a demand
for the release of the lessee's interest. 145 The lessee returned the
check to the lessor and refused to give the release. 146 Later rental
payments reflected the true ownership situation but were rejected
by the lessor. 
4 7
Cancellation of the lease was denied by the federal district
court which held that the lessor's failure to notify the lessee of the
change in the status of the county's reservation was a basis for
estopping the lessor "to assert that the lease involved has been
terminated.' ' 48 The court found that the lessor "did intentionally
and deliberately lead the [lessee] to believe that the facts concerning
the correct acreage remained unchanged from those which existed
at the time of the execution of the lease, and such acts and
omissions were acted upon by the [lessee]." 1
49
In affirming the district court, the court of appeals noted with
approval 50 the well-known Texas case, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
139. See generally 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 49, ch. 36 (1967 & Supp. 1981) (chapter entitled
"Drilling Clause ofOil and cGas Lease - Equitable Considerations").
140. 238 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).
141. Hove v. Atchison. 238 F.2d 819, 820-21 (8th Cir. 1956). In Hove the lesser interest clause
read as follows: "If said lessor owns a less interest in the above described land than the entire and
undivided fee simple estate therein, then the royalties and rentals herein provided shall be paid the
lessor only in proportion which his interest bears to the whole and undivided fee." Id. at 820.
142. Id. at 821-22.
143. Id. at 822-23.
144. Id. at 822.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 821.
148. Hove v. Atchison. 138 F. Supp. 486. 491-92 (D.N.D.. q[fd. 238 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).
149. 138 F. Supp. at 491.
150. 238 F.2d at 823.
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Harrison. 151 In Harrison a lease was saved from the operation of the
special limitation of the unless clause in a decision based upon two
rationales: (1) A lessee is not required at its peril to properly
interpret ambiguous conveyances to which the lessor but not the
lessee is a party, 152 and (2) the lessor had knowledge of the lessee's
erroneous construction of an ambiguous document in advance of
the rental payment date, but did not advise the lessee that the error
had resulted in the lessee's failure to make the correct rental
payment. 1
53
In Harrison the lessor furnished the lessee with a copy of the
instrument in question, and the lessee construed it differently than
did the Texas court, thus making an incorrect rental payment. The
situation in Harrison is like that in Hove to the extent that the lessor
knew something the lessee did not know (in Harrison the correct
interpretation of the instrument and in Hove the fact that title to an
additional fifty percent of the minerals in a portion of the leased
lands had been quieted in the lessor) and did not communicate this
information until the rental date was past. In Harrison, of course,
the lessor gave the lessee the instrument transferring a part of the
minerals, and the lessee misinterpreted it.
The lessee in Harrison chose to construe the instrument rather
than filing an interpleader action while paying into court the total
rentals due, 154 or, in the alternative, drawing a check to all of the
lessors jointly and directing the depository bank to credit the
payee's accounts in accordance with their interests, leaving it up to
the lessors to assert their interests. 155 The first reason stated above
for the decision in Harrison is not a strong basis for the result in the
case considering these alternatives.
When the first basis of decision in Harrison is evaluated in
terms of its appropriate impact on the situation in Hove, one must
reach the conclusion that it has no appropriate bearing on the
decision in Hove. Nothing was communicated in Hove until after the
rental date was past. 56 The lessee in Hove could have taken on the
investigation of the title to the lands it had leased prior to making a
rental payment. Such an investigation should have turned up the
fact of the invalidity of the county's fifty percent mineral
reservation. It is the usual rule, however, that there is no burden on
the lessee to investigate the title before a rental payment. 157
151. 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947).
152. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 224, 205 S.W.2d 355, 361 (1947).
153. Id. at 226, 205 S.W.2d at 361.
154. See generally 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 49, S 34.4( 0 .
155. See generally 3 WILLIAMS & MFYERS, supra note 45, § 606.5(4).
156. 238 F.2d at 822.
157. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 583, 46 So. 2d 907, 909 (1950).
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The first reason for the Harrison decision protects a lessee in the
Harrison situation even if the lessor did not know before the rental
date of the lessee's mistaken interpretation of the instrument. This
is true because the reason focuses entirely on the lessee's
responsibilities under the rental clause. The second reason for the
Harrison decision, taken alone, would operate to protect a lessee in
the Hove situation. It would put a lessor with knowledge of a lessee's
mistaken rental payment in a situation where the lessor would
always have to warn the lessee if the lessor knew that an error in
payment had been made. Such a rule would put a premium on a
lessor's ignorance of any problem prior to the passing of the rental
date. Litigation conducted under such a legal structure would, no
doubt, reflect the evidentiary possibilities inherent in the rule.
Harrison can be read as communicating a much narrower
judicial message: the lessor is estopped in a situation where an
ambiguous instrument to which the lessee is not a party has an
impact on rentals and where the lessor has a chance to warn the
lessee that the instrument has been misinterpreted and does not do
so. Since this narrow statement of the holding in Harrison includes
the element of the communication to the lessee of the contents of the
ambiguous instrument, it has no bearing on Hove. The result in
Hove may best be based on the relatively simple proposition that a
lessee may continue to pay rentals as they have been paid in the
past until information is received that changes the rental structure.
The doctrine of reformation of instruments on the ground of
mutual mistake, relied on by the lessee in Norman Jessen,158 was
recognized but not applied by the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Schwartzenberger v. Hunt Trust Estate. 159 The lease in Schwartzenberger
provided for delay rentals at the rate of one dollar per mineral
acre. 160 There were 419.27 surface acres included in the lease.1
61
The trial court found that the parties were mutually mistaken as to
the number of acres affected by governmental mineral
reservations. 162 The lease contained a lesser interest clause which
was utilized to pay rentals on the basis of 398.31 mineral acres on
the first rental date following the execution of the lease.1 63 In fact,
the lessors owned 406.31 mineral acres, a state of title that was
reflected in the public records. 
164
158. NormanJessen & Assocs. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d at 652.
159. 244 N.W.2d 711 (N.D. 1976).
160. Schwartzenberger v. Hunt Trust Estate, 244 N.W.2d 711, 716 (N.D. 1976).
161. Id. at 714.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 713.
164. Id. at 715, 717.
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Prior to the second rental date the lessors notified the lessee
that they considered the rentals to have been paid improperly and
that the lease was terminated.1 65 The lessee replied, claiming
proper payment of the rentals. 166 The lessors answered through an
attorney who stated that he had been retained "to commence an
action to cancel ' 167 the lease and, further: "In the event we do not
hear from you by the 14th of April, 1974, [the rental date was July
251 we shall proceed with an action for cancellation .... "168 In
spite of this invitation the lessee did not acknowledge the mineral
acreage error until its answer was filed in the September 1974 suit
for cancellation. At that time the lessee tendered amounts sufficient
to make up the deficiencies in the bonus and rentals.
169
The cancellation suit continued, however, and the trial court
found that there had been a mutual mistake which the court
remedied by ordering reformation of the lease. ' 7 0 The decree would
have left the lease in full force subject to the lessee's payment of the
deficient bonus and rentals. 1 7 1 The supreme court accepted the trial
court's finding of mutual mistake but reversed, refusing to order
reformation on the facts before it. 1
7 2
In its argument on appeal the lessee took special note of the
Harrison case.' 73 The supreme court found Harrison unpersuasive
for two reasons: (1) The lessee in Schwartzenberger was negligent in
not determining the proper state of the mineral title to the land it
leased by a competent examination of the public record, and (2) the
lessee had adequate notice from the lessor's communication to
allow correction of the rental payments. 74 The court compared the
conduct of the lessee before it unfavorably to that of the lessee in
Harrison. The opinion noted that the Harrison lessee "while denying
error, nevertheless tendered an amount more than sufficient to
cover the disputed amount." 7 5 It must be noted, however, that in
Harrison this tender occurred after the crucial underpayment of the
rental had been made to a knowing and uncommunicative lessor. 76
Schwartzenberger is not entirely clear concerning which rental
payment before the court is considered the crucial rental payment.
165. Id. at 715.
166. Id. at 715-16.
167. Id. at 716.
168. Id. (emphasis omitted).
169. Id. at 714, 717.
170. Id. at 714.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 718.
173. Id. at 716.
174. Id. at 717.
175. Id.
176. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 221-22, 226, 205 S.W.2d 355,
358,361 (1947).
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The lease had a date of July 25, 1972.177 The bonus of three dollars
per acre was paid on the basis of the mistaken view of the number
of mineral acres covered. 178 The same mistake was apparently
reflected in the payment of the July 25, 1973 rental. The July 25,
1974 rental payment also reflected a mistake in the number of
mineral acres involved. 179 The opinion describes the 1974 rental
situation: "The record discloses that the [lessee], after written
notice, first denied its obligation to pay a greater amount to retain
its lease, and then ignored a repeated contention that it was in error
until the [lessors], some five months later in justified impatience,
brought the present action." 
180
Is the Schwartzenberger court saying that the lease before it could
have been saved if the lessee had adjusted its 1974 payment to
accord with the real mineral acreage? Does this mean that the lease
remained in effect after the mistaken payment in 1973? If the
answer to these questions is yes, as the opinion intimates, then
certainly payment under mutual mistake which is not the result of
the lessee's having acted "negligently," as the court says was the
case in the lessee's checking of the records in Schwartzenberger, is
subject to equitable correction, and the lease will not terminate by
virtue of the operation of the special limitation in the unless clause.
The lessee must not, however, hold to its erroneous position as
stubbornly as did the lessee in Schwartzenberger. Once notice of the
possible error is received, the lessee must pay. He may continue to
assert that the position taken previously is correct, but he must pay.
Failure to do so will end the lease and render the lessee ineligible for
equitable relief.
Although the Schwartzenberger opinion gives much attention to
Harrison, the differences in that case cause it to have a negative
impact on the lessee's case in Schwartzenberger. 8' It is useful to again
accentuate the differences between the two cases. The payment of
rentals in Harrison was made to a knowing lessor who waited until
the rental date was past to spring the "unless" trap on the lessee.
The 1973 payment in Schwartzenberger was made by a lessee
characterized as negligent by the court since a proper, and
apparently routine, interpretation of the public records would have
cleared up the matter. Further, and of greater importance, the 1973
payment was made to a lessor ignorant of the real state of his title.
177. 244 N.W.2d at 712.
178. Id. art713.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 717.
181. Id.
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One cannot help but draw the impression from Schwartzenberger
that the negligence would have been forgiven if the lessee had
adjusted the payment for 1974 to accord with the current
information on acreage communicated by the lessor. Stubbornness
in hewing to an erroneous position after notice seems to bar
equitable relief under Schwartzenberger.
The status of the use of equitable intervention to blunt the
application of the determinable fee principles of the unless clause
after Norman Jessen can now be examined. The Schwartzenberger
emphasis on the negligence of the lessee in ascertaining the true
state of the title comes to mind because the ownership of the land
leased in NormanJessen was apparent on the face of the record at the
time of the first lease. 82 One could say that there was negligence in
not making a proper title examination to determine the appropriate
persons to name and pay as lessors. The lease, however, named all
of the persons who had succeeded to ownership on the death of their
ancestor and all of those named were paid in accordance with the
lease. 183 Payments were not reduced erroneously by virtue of inept
title determinations as in Schwartzenberger, but payments were made
to the persons listed as lessors on the face of the lease in accordance
with the language of the rental clause providing for "tender to the
lessor' 18 4 on or before the rental date. 1 85 With such a lease the
rental payments to the named lessors in exact performance of the
requirements set forth on the face of the lease seem perfectly
proper. It appears that the lessee need not examine the title and
lease only from the true owners.
It seems unnecessary to speak of estoppel or mutual mistake to
sustain the rental payments that were made to the named lessors
until the lessee was made aware of the true state of the title. The
question of entitlement to past rental payments made to former co-
owners was a matter between them and the present owners. These
entitlements should have no impact on the lessee or the status of the
lease.
Once, of course, the true state of the title is brought home to a
lessee by an appropriate notice from the lessors, an adjustment in
the rentals is called for. Before that time, however, the lessee is
paying in accordance with the terms of the lease and there is no
reason to discuss the impact of either mutual mistake or estoppel of
182. Norman Jessen & Assocs. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d at 651.
183. Id. at 649. All persons named as lessors apparently signed identical leases in carrying out
the leasing transaction. This appears from the court's reference to "the leases" and the setting out of
the common terms and dates of"the lease." Id.
184. Id. at 649 n. 1.
185. Id. at 649.
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the lessors. On this view of the matter, summary judgment by the
trial court was appropriate in NormanJessen, but it should have been
in favor of Amoco, not Norman Jessen.
Another factor in the case makes it important to distinguish
the basis for the decision suggested above, that rental payments
made in accordance with the lease are proper until appropriate
notice is received by the lessee. That factor is the emphasis the
court places on the "expensive seismographical survey" that
Amoco had made. 18 6 This emphasis raises the possibility that the
application of an estoppel doctrine requires more than reliance on
the continuation of the lease to the extent of making further tenders
of delay rentals. It raises the possibility that, in fact, there must be a
situation such as that described in the early North Dakota case of
Woodside v. Lee,' 87 "the retention of rentals [by the lessor] relied on
by the lessee to the extent that he thereafter commenced the drilling
of a well . .. "188 Given the impact that the nuances of factual
setting can have on the successful invocation of equitable doctrines,
the possibility of deciding a case like Norman Jessen on the basis of
payments made in accordance with the terms of the lease as written
is very attractive. 
89
V. CONCLUSION
The intricate structure that has developed in American oil and
gas law has its roots in the private ownership of the minerals in
much of the land in this country. In oil and gas law, as in other
fields, one can be concerned that the complexity arising from the
clash of interests under the rule of an adversarial legal system is
unproductive and perhaps unworkable. As is true of other
186.7d. at 652.
187.81 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1957).
188. Woodside v. Lee, 81 N.W.2d 745, 747 (N.D. 1957) (quoting Vaughan v. Doss, 219 Ark.
963. 245 S.W.2d 826 (1952)). &
189. In a North Dakota Supreme Court case decided after Normanjessen, the court considered a
situation in which the lessee paid rentals on the basis of the lessors' ownership of 60 mineral acres in a
particular quarter section, although the lease was drafted and executed on the assumption that 80
mineral acres were being leased. Borth v. Gulf Oil Exploration & Prod. Co., 313 N.W.2d 706, 707-
08 (N.D. 1981). The correct acreage was 80 acres, but rentals were paid and accepted on the basis of
60 mineral acres for three years. Id. at 708. A proper examination of the records would have
disclosed the true acreage involved, but the lessee relied on the erroneous conclusions of its assignor.
Id. at 710. When the truth was discovered by the lessors' attorney and communicated to the lessee,
the lessee offered payment to bring the past payments to a level consonant with a lease of80 mineral
acres. Id. at 708. The lessors refused such payments and claimed that the lease had terminated. Id. at
709. In these circumstances the court found "the doctrines of estoppel, laches, or mutual mistake"
unavailable "to validate the entire 80-acre mineral lease." Id. at 711. The court instead adopted the
doctrine applied in Kugel v. Young, 132 Colo. 529. 291 P.2d 695 (1955), that the proffer of a rental
amount for an acreage less than that covered by the lease amounted to an offer to keep only the lesser
acreage. When accepted, it continued the lease on only that amount. 313 N.W.2d at 711-12 (citing
132 Colo, at 545, 291 P.2d at 704). Thus. the court in Borth "terminated the lease as to 20 acres
and... validated the lease as to the 60 acres .. " 313 N.W.2d at 712.
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institutions in this society, however, the imperfections are muted
when alternatives are considered. This comforting proposition does
not reduce the responsibility of the profession to attempt, having
professional regard for the interests of their clients, such changes in
the direction of simplicity as will improve the possibility of
predicting the future of property arrangements and to attempt to
direct the energies of the profession toward counseling rather than
litigation.
It is in this spirit that I offer these occasionally critical
comments on the recent work of the Supreme Court of North
Dakota in the field of oil and gas law. I am well aware that it is
easier to criticize than to decide and that supreme courts, in
addition to their responsibility for the development of the law, must
make decisions.
